Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

Max Blouin and Stephane Pallage
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Max Blouin: CIRPEE and Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2008, vol. 52, issue 4, 548-565

Abstract: The authors examine the effects that famine relief efforts (food aid) can have in regions undergoing civil war. In the model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they can loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. The authors identify a delivery plan for aid that minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

Keywords: humanitarian aid; food aid; civil war; warlords; famine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jocore:v:52:y:2008:i:4:p:548-565

DOI: 10.1177/0022002708316742

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