Continuity of the First Price Auction Nash Equilibrium Correspondance

Bernard Lebrun ()

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Abstract:

Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some particular probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9922

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Manuel Paradis ().