Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence

Bernard Lebrun ()

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 20, issue 3, 435-453

Abstract: Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics.

Keywords: First price auctions; Nash equilibrium correspondence; Robustness of numerical and theoretical results. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-21
Note: Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: July 27, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: Continuity of the First Price Auction Nash Equilibrium Correspondance (1999)
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