Do Players’ Beliefs or Risk Attitudes Determine The Equilibrium Selections in 2x2 Coordination Games?

Thomas Neumann and Bodo Vogt ()
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Bodo Vogt: Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

No 9024, FEMM Working Papers from Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management

Abstract: This study focuses on the question whether it is risk aversion or the beliefs of players that explains the strategic choices in 2x2 coordination games. In a laboratory experiment, we elicit the risk attitudes by using lottery choices. Furthermore, using a quadratic scoring rule, subjects’ beliefs about the choice of the opponent are elicited directly. Our data show that participants’ behavior is not explained by risk attitude, but rather is explained as their best response to their stated first order beliefs.

Keywords: experimental economics; coordination games; equilibrium selection; first order beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2009-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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