State capacity and executive constraints in early modern Europe

Antonio Henriques, K. Kivanc Karaman and Nuno Palma

Lewis Lab Working Papers Series from Arthur Lewis Lab, The University of Manchester

Abstract: The prevailing view of Europe’s political history is that the rise of constrained governments and the increases in state capacity advanced hand in hand. In this study, we reevaluate this perspective by constructing new historical indices for both. Our findings challenge the presumed connection, illustrating that high-capacity states existed under unconstrained government, and low-capacity states existed under constrained regimes. We also identify what made England historically distinctive: its political system stood out for combining constrained government with high state capacity. This rare combination helps explain the eventual take-off of modern economic growth in England.

Keywords: historical political economy; executive constraints; state capacity; government effectiveness; checks and balances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 N13 O10 O23 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:man:allwps:0010

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