Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government

John Burbidge and Gordon Myers

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: We study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of costly governments leads to lower non–cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tariffs but do not eliminate them, even with lump–sum taxes and transfers.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2000-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government (2004)
Working Paper: Tariff Wars and Trade Deals With Costly Government (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2000-05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().