Tariff Wars and Trade Deals With Costly Government

John B. Burbridge () and Gordon Myers
Additional contact information
John B. Burbridge: McMaster University, http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: John Burbidge

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University

Abstract: We study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and disbursement uses resources. The introduction of a costly government leads to lower non-cooperative tariffs, the possibility that a less costly government may win a tariff war, and fully cooperative trade deals where countries lower tariffs but do not eliminate them, even with lump-sum taxes and transfers.

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000, Revised 2000-06-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sfu.ca/repec-econ/sfu/sfudps/dp00-15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government (2004)
Working Paper: Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp00-15

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

The price is Canada/United States-$3.00(Cdn)/paper,International-$5.00/paper.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6, Canada. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Working Paper Coordinator ().