What Norms Trigger Punishment

Jeffrey Carpenter and Peter Matthews

Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics

Abstract: Many experiments have demonstrated the power of norm enforcement-peer monitoring and punishment-to maintain, or even increase, contributions in social dilemma settings, but little is known about the underlying norms that monitors use to make punishment decisions. Using a large sample of experimental data, we empirically recover the set of norms used most often by monitors and show ?rst that the decision to punish should be modeled separately from the decision of how much to punish. Second, we show that absolute norms often ?t the data better than the group average norm often assumed in related work. Third, we ?nd that di?erent norms seem to in?uence the decisions about punishing violators inside and outside one’s own group.

Keywords: public good; experiment; punishment; social norm; norm enforcement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0708.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What norms trigger punishment? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0708

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