Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion
Christopher Cotton () and
Arnaud Dellis ()
No 2013-03, Working Papers from University of Miami, Department of Economics
This paper challenges the prevailing view in the literature that informational lobbying is socially beneficial. Key to our analysis is the fact that policymakers are constrained on the number of issues they can address, which forces them to prioritize issues. Under reasonable conditions, interest groups advocating less-salient reforms produce information, inducing policymakers to prioritize those reforms instead of more-salient ones. Such distortion of the policy agenda reduces social welfare. Our story is consistent with empirical accounts of the lobbying process.
Keywords: Informational lobbying; agenda setting; information collection; persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-pol
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http://bus.miami.edu/_assets/files/repec/WP2013-03.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion (2016)
Working Paper: Informational Lobbying And Agenda Distortion (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mia:wpaper:2013-03
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