EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion

Christopher Cotton () and Arnaud Dellis ()

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2016, vol. 32, issue 4, 762-793

Abstract: This article challenges the prevailing view that pure informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) leads to better informed policymaking. In the absence of lobbying, the policymaker (PM) may prioritize more promising issues. Recognizing this, interest groups involved with other issues have a greater incentive to lobby in order to change the issues that the PM learns about and prioritizes. We show how informational lobbying can be detrimental, in the sense that it can lead to less informed PMs and worse policy. This is because informational lobbying can lead to the prioritization of less important issues with active lobbies, and can crowd out information collection by the PM on issues with more likely beneficial reforms. The analysis fully characterizes the set of detrimental lobbying equilibria under two alternative types of issue asymmetry. (JEL D72, D78, D83)

JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jleo/eww005 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Informational Lobbying And Agenda Distortion (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion (2012) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:4:p:762-793.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization is currently edited by Pablo T. Spiller

More articles in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization from Oxford University Press Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2021-09-16
Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:32:y:2016:i:4:p:762-793.