Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Do Motivations Matter?

Luca Stanca, Luigino Bruni () and Luca Corazzini

No 109, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: One of the key issues for understanding reciprocity is how people evaluate the kindness of an action. In this paper we argue that the motivation driving an action plays an important role for the reciprocating response to that action. We test experimentally the hypothesis that reciprocal behavior is stronger in response to actions driven by intrinsic motivation, as opposed to extrinsic motivation. Our results indicate that reciprocity is significantly stronger when extrinsic motivation can be ruled out, both at the aggregate and the individual level. These findings suggest that models of reciprocal behavior should take into account not only outcomes but also intentions and, in particular, motivations: the type of motivation of an action matters for its perceived kindness and, as a consequence, for reciprocity.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Intrinsic Motivation; Laboratory Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2007, Revised 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper109.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter? (2009)
Working Paper: Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Do Motivations Matter? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:109

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