Why Pro-Defendant Criminal Procedure Might Hurt the Innocent

Matteo Rizzolli and Nuno Garoupa

No 137, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: Mandatory disclosure of evidence and double jeopardy are considered to be among the most important bulwarks against prosecutorial misconducts. While protecting the generality of defendants in the criminal process, we show that under certain reasonable assumptions, these procedural mechanisms hurt innocent defendants by inducing prosecutors to adjust their behavior and thus triggering adverse practices.

Keywords: double jeopardy; disclosure; evidence; prosecutor; defendant; criminal procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2008-04, Revised 2008-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:137

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