Education and selective vouchers

Amedeo Piolatto

No 177, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: A widely accepted result in the literature is that the majority of votersare against the introduction of universal vouchers. Chen and West (2000) predict that voters' attitudes towards selective vouchers (SV) may be dif- ferent. They claim that voters are indi®erent between the no-voucher and SV regimes, unless competition leads to a reduction in the education price. I show that, when public schools are congested, the majority of voters are in favour of SV. Furthermore, SV induces a Pareto improvement. In equili- brium, the introduction of SV induces a reduction in income strati¯cation at school, with some relatively poor students attending private schools.

Keywords: positive public economics; education; vouchers; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H42 I20 I22 I28 I29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-01, Revised 2010-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Education and selective vouchers (2010)
Working Paper: Education and selective vouchers (2009)
Working Paper: Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers (2008)
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