Francesco De Sinopoli,
Leo Ferraris () and
Giovanna Iannantuoni ()
No 211, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics
We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultane- ous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by ma- jority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2011-07, Revised 2011-07
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http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper211.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Moderating Government (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:211
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