EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Moderating Government

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris () and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 45, issue 2, 415-440

Abstract: We consider a model where policy motivated citizens vote in two simultaneous elections, one for the President who is elected by majority rule, in a single national district, and one for the Congressmen, each of whom is elected by majority rule in a local district. The policy to be implemented depends not only on who is elected President but also on the composition of the Congress. We characterize the equilibria of the model using a conditional sincerity concept that takes into account the possibility that some voters may be simultaneously decisive in both elections. Such a concept emerges naturally in a model with trembles. A crucial feature of the solution is the moderation of Government. Our results are robust to several modifications of the model. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: C72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Moderating Government (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Moderating Government (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:415-440

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0901-8

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2024-12-29
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:45:y:2015:i:2:p:415-440