Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior

Alex Possajennikov ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics

Abstract: I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite populations in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2001-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior (2003)
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