Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior
Alex Possajennikov ()
Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics
I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite populations in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Pages: 14 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de:80 (No such host is known. )
Journal Article: Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mik:wpaper:01_10
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Eva Borchard (). This e-mail address is bad, please contact .