Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior

Alex Possajennikov ()

Economic Theory, 2003, vol. 21, issue 4, 928 pages

Abstract: I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Evolution; Aggregate-taking; Aggregative games.; JEL Classification Numbers: C72. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Working Paper: Evolutionary Foundations of Aggregate-Taking Behavior (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0261-3

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