The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

Kai Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Dortmund, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.

Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2006-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2007)
Working Paper: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2007)
Working Paper: The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information (2005)
Working Paper: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2005)
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