The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction with Complete Information

Kai Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger

No 1609, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ’early’ and a group of players who choose ’late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ’late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.

Keywords: sequential all-pay auction; complete information; generalized cost; generalized Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1609.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2007)
Working Paper: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2007)
Working Paper: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2006)
Working Paper: The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1609

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().