With a little help from my enemy: comparative advertising as a signal of quality

Francesca Barigozzi, Paolo Garella and Martin Peitz

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano

Abstract: We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal, using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one’s own product to that of a rival’s, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.

Keywords: Advertising; Quality; signaling; Entry; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L15 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Related works:
Journal Article: With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2008-31

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