OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAREER CONCERNS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Robert Gibbons and Kevin Murphy ()

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Keywords: financial incentives; occupations; retirement; market; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 1990
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1992)
Working Paper: Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1991)
Working Paper: Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence (1990)
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