A Theory of Misgovernance

Abhijit Banerjee

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper tries to explain why government bureaucraties are often associated with red tape, corruption and lack of incentives. The paper identifies two specific ingredients which together can provide an explanation - the fact that governments o ften act precisely in situations where markets fail and the presence of agency problems within the government. We shoe that thses problems are exacerbated at low levels of development and in bureaucracies dealing with poor people. We also argue that we ne ed to posit the existence of a welfare-oriented constituency within the government in order to explain red tape and corruption.

Keywords: GOVERNMENT; CORRUPTION; BUREAUCRACY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (284)

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Journal Article: A Theory of Misgovernance (1997)
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