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Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments

Nikos Nikiforakis ()

No 1036, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower contributions and earnings compared to a treatment in which subjects receive information about the contri- butions of their peers even though the feedback format does not a¤ect incentives. The data suggest that this is because the feedback format acts as a coordination device, which in?uences the contribution standards that groups establish

Keywords: feedback format; peer punishment; public good game; altruistic pun-ishment; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments (2010) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1036

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