Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment

Nikos Nikiforakis () and Dirk Engelmann

No 1058, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to whether a punish- ment can trigger a feud. In the main treatment (Feud) the number of punishment stages is endogenously determined and avoiding revenge is impossible. Participants are generally found to employ strategies that avoid the break out of feuds. While the possibility of a feud a¤ects punishment and contribution patterns, total earnings are not signi?cantly di¤erent from that in treatments where punishment opportunities do not exist or where punishment opportunities exist, but there is no possibility of escalation.

Keywords: feuds; public goods; punishment; revenge; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/802734/1058.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1058

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dandapani Lokanathan ().