Does the Size of the Action Set Matter for Coorperation

Lata Gangadharan (lata.gangadharan@monash.edu) and Nikos Nikiforakis (n.nikiforakis@gmail.com)

No 1072, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We use the voluntary contribution mechanism to investigate whether smaller action sets lead to higher cooperation rates. We ?nd that this is the case for groups of four players.

Keywords: action set; voluntary contribution mechanism; prisoner?s dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Does the size of the action set matter for cooperation? (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1072

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