Inequality Aversion and the Optimal Composition of Government Expenditure
John Creedy,
Shuyun May Li and
Solmaz Moslehi ()
No 1086, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne
Abstract:
This paper examines the choice of government expenditure on public goods and transfer payments, in the form of a pension, in an overlapping generations model. Government expenditure is tax-financed on a pay-asyou- go basis. A utilitarian judge chooses expenditures to maximize a social welfare function. The nonlinear solution is found to involve the ratio of a welfare-weighted average income, which depends on the inequality aversion of the judge, to arithmetic mean income. An approximation for this ratio is found which produces explicit solutions for the optimal composition. The result is used to obtain an indication of ‘implicit’ inequality aversion for a range of countries.
Keywords: Overlapping Generations; Composition of Government Expenditure; Utilitarian Social Welfare Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 H41 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/801176/1086.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: INEQUALITY AVERSION AND THE OPTIMAL COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE (2010) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1086
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dandapani Lokanathan ().