Normative Conflict & Feuds: The Limits of Self-Enforcement

Nikos Nikiforakis (), Charles Noussair and Tom Wilkening

No 1120, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than in a setting in which no conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation,the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.

Keywords: normative conflict; peer punishment; feuds; counter-punishment; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1120

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