Herding Among Bureaucrats

Branko Boskovic, David P.Byrne, Arvind Magesan
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arvind Nathan Magesan and David P. Byrne

No 1158, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: The herding of expert opinions is often rationalized as the outcome of social learning. However,experts are typically individuals with career concerns. As a result, herding can also arise from the fear of opposing consensus opinion and the potential career consequences of being wrong. We empirically test for social learning and career concerns using novel data on bureaucrats' expert opinions over whether to publicly provide health insurance for pharmaceuticals. We and robust evidence that career concerns are an important source of herd behavior in these policy choices. Our findings have implications for the delegation of policy-making to experts.

Keywords: D80; H77; I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Working Paper: Herding Among Bureaucrats (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1158

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