Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing

Peter Bardsley

No 548, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Tax compliance is modelled as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a costly state verification game with imperfect auditing. Neither the tax payer nor the auditor can measure the tax payer's true liability precisely: they observe independent noisy signals.

Keywords: TAXES; TAXATION; GAMES; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 H20 H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing (1996)
Working Paper: Tax Compliance games with Imperfect Auditing (1994)
Working Paper: Tax Compliance games with Imperfect Auditing (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:548

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dandapani Lokanathan ().