The Optimal Management of Research Portfolios

Peter Bardsley

No 549, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Risky research projects are, other things being equal, intrinsically harder to monitor than those which are less risky. It is shown, using agency theory that a standard cost benefit analysis which ignores the agency problem will introduce a bias towards excessively risky projects.

Keywords: MANAGEMENT; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O30 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: The optimal management of research portfolios (1999)
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