Team Selection with Asymmetric Agents

Katerina Sherstyuk

No 572, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: In shallow markets where there are mutual gains from cooperation among agents, collusive behavior may occur even if it does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Yet, such behavior is rarely sustainable. Bolle (1994) reports the results of one period team selection experiments in which subjects often did not follow the Nash equilibrium behavior but engaged in "tacit collusion". We test the robustness of Bolle's findings by introducing asymmetry into subjects' characteristics and repeating the experiment for a number of periods.

Keywords: ECONOMETRICS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1997
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