EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Achieving the Best Fiscal Outcome: What Does the Government Need to Know?

J.P. Stemp

No 642, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: This paper examines the operation of fiscal policy under incomplete information when the central bank sets the stance of monetary policy so as to achieve a zero inflation target. The fiscal authority is assumed to aim to achieve a target level for output and a zero level of public debt. The best fiscal policy setting arises under full information and is one where output atains its full employment level and public debt is driven to zero. Deviations from full infomration can lead to a considerable divergence from the best fiscal setting involving substantial levels of public sector indebtedness. The result ssuggest that a government shoudl invest avilable resources determining what outcomes are achievable and what outcomes are not. Then it should focus all its energies on trying to deliver achievable outcomes. The benefits from such a strategy can be substantial.

Keywords: FISCAL POLICY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E60 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:642

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 4th Floor, FBE Building, Level 4, 111 Barry Street. Victoria, 3010, Australia. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dandapani Lokanathan ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-10
Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:642