RJV in Product Innovation and the Form of Market Competition

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and D. Sasaki

No 668, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: This paper investigates the endogenous choice between price- and quantity-setting behaviour in a duopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and then play a marketing game later. Only in the initial R&D stage, the two firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs of product innovation. a

Keywords: GAME THEORY; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mlb:wpaper:668

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