Delays in Bargaining With Incompelete Contracts

Andrew Wait ()

No 809, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain delays in bargaining. This is not always appropriate, particularly when the parties are in a long-term relationship. This paper examines the incentive to delay agreement (or innovation) when: there are multiple bargaining periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; INFORMATION; DISTRIBUTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2001
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