An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity

Suren Basov

No 812, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: Despite the pervasiveness of reciprocal behavior, it has received little attention in the economic literature. In this paper, I consider an evolutionary model of reciprocity. The main findings of this paper are that evolution can support reciprocal behavior for the fraction of population, which is insensitive to the stakes involved, but is sensitive to the cohesiveness of the relationships. These findings match stylized facts learned from experimental and field studies of reciprocity.

Keywords: BEHAVIOUR; ECONOMIC MODELS; RECIPROCITY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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