Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations

Peter Bardsley and Katerina Sherstyuk

No 825, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: In an ongoing organization, such as a large law parternship firm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion, and the opportunity to influence policy and make the rules in the future. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design. We model career design in such a firm as a recursive mechanism design problem in an overlapping generations environment.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; GENERATIONS; COSTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Rat Races and Glass Ceilings- Career Paths in Organizations (2001)
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