Non-profit organizations in a bureaucratic environment

Paul Grout and Wendelin Schnedler

No 08-17, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: How does the environment of an organization infuence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bu- reaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.

Keywords: donated labor; intrinsic motivation; non-profit organizations; power within organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H42 J32 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2311/1/dp08_17.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2311

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