Bankers and the performance of German firms

Bankers on the boards of German firms: what they do, what they are worth, and why they are (still) there

Ernst Maug, Ingolf Dittmann and Christoph Schneider

No 07-40, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: We analyze the role of bankers on the boards of German non-financial companies for the period from 1994 to 2005. We find that banks that are represented on a firm’s board promote their own business as lenders and as M&A advisors. They also seem to act as financial experts who help firms to obtain funding, especially in difficult times. We find little evidence that bankers monitor management and suggest that bankers on the board cause a decline in the valuations of non-financial firms. Banks’ equity ownership declined sharply during our sample period and the German financial system lost some of its formerly distinctive features.

Keywords: Banks; Board of Directors; Corporate Governance; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2528/1/dp_07_40.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2528

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504 Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Katharina Rautenberg ().