Repeated game strategies in local and group prisoner's dilemma

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

No 00-50, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.

Keywords: Local interaction; experiments; prisoner’s dilemma; reinforcement; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 D83 H41 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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