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Repeated Game Strategies in Local and Group Prisoner`s Dilemma

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

No 00-50, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from observed data in spatial and spaceless prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We start with a model where players choose a fixed action that remains constant for all repetitions of a stage game. As an extension we then allow players to choose simple repeated game strategies that, however, remain fixed over the course of the game. We then discuss a method how to identify changing repeated game strategies. This method is used to study a simple reinforcement model. We find that in a spatial structure reinforcement plays a more important role than in a spaceless structure.

Keywords: Local interaction; experiments; prisoner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 D83 H41 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2000-10-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Working Paper: Repeated game strategies in local and group prisoner's dilemma (2001) Downloads
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