A learning approach to auctions

Shlomit Hon-Snir, Dov Monderer and Aner Sela

No 97-11, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 D44 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2900/1/dp97_11.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A Learning Approach to Auctions (1998)
Working Paper: A learning approach to auctions (1997)
Working Paper: A Learning Approach to Auctions (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2900

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