A learning approach to auctions

S. Hon-Suir, Dov Monderer and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
S. Hon-Suir: Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management Technion, Postal: Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 3200, Israel
Dov Monderer: Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management, Postal: The Technion, Haifa 3200, Israel

No 97-11, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then for sufficiently large time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1997-06-01
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp97-11.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Learning Approach to Auctions (1998)
Working Paper: A learning approach to auctions (1997)
Working Paper: A Learning Approach to Auctions (1996)
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