Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints

Edmond Baranes and David Bardey

Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) from CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1

Abstract: This paper studies competition between Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and “Conventional Insurers”. Most of the time, MCOs sign exclusive contracts with providers and these vertical restrictions associated to differentiation in the providers'market imply a risk segmentation. Taking into account this phenomenon, we show that vertical restrictions in the health insurance sector can paradoxically create an “anti-raise rivals cost effect” in which MCOs. penetration allows to decrease conventional insurers premiums.

Keywords: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS; MANAGED CARE; COMPETITION POLICY. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 I11 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.creden.univ-montp1.fr/downloads/cahiers/CC-04-05-45.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:credwp:04.05.45

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) from CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 CREDEN, Faculté d'Economie, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 MONTPELLIER Cedex 2, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Olivier ROUSSE ().