Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints
E. Baranes and
David Bardey
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1
Abstract:
This paper studies competition between Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and Conventional Insurers. Most of the time, MCOs sign exclusive contracts with providers and these vertical restrictions associated to differentiation in the providers’ market imply a risk segmentation. Taking into account this phenomenon, we show that vertical restrictions in the health insurance sector can paradoxically create an anti-raise rivals’ cost effect in which MCOs’ penetration allows to decrease conventional insurers’ premiums.
Keywords: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS; MANAGED CARE; COMPETITION POLICY. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 I11 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2004.13
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