Career Concerns and Asymmetric Missions

R. Nikolova

Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1

Abstract: We use a simple career concerns model with two tasks and additive technology to shed some light on agent’s incentives for effort repartition. We establish the conditions under which the agent concentrates his effort on one of the tasks and discuss the implications of the in-formational structure on his choice. In particular, it is shown that increasing information precision may distort incentives and harms the principal’s interest.

Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2004.10

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