Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods
Guillaume Cheikbossian ()
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1
We present a model of endogenous public good provision and group rent-seeking influence e.g. lobbying. Specifically, two groups with different preferences over public good consumption and different sizes engage in rent-seeking activities to influence policymaking in their preferred direction. When there is within-group cooperation in lobbying, both groups neutralize each other in the political process. Without within-group cooperation, the free-rider problem in lobbying makes the smaller group politically influent. In both cases, rent-seeking by each group is increasing in the degree of preference heterogeneity and in membership size of both groups.
Keywords: Public Goods; Rent-seeking; Free-rider problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H41 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.16
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