Lobbying, Spillovers and the Benefits of Decentralization
Guillaume Cheikbossian ()
Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1
In the presence of spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even if localities have identical preferences. Indeed, free-riding costs associated to decentralization may be larger than the costs of lobbying activities under centralization.
Keywords: (De)centralization; Local Public Goods; lobbying; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.17
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