EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lobbying, Spillovers and the Benefits of Decentralization

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1

Abstract: In the presence of spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods may lead to a higher surplus than centralized provision even if localities have identical preferences. Indeed, free-riding costs associated to decentralization may be larger than the costs of lobbying activities under centralization.

Keywords: (De)centralization; Local Public Goods; lobbying; Spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.laser.univ-montp1.fr/Cahiers/cahier170405.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.laser.univ-montp1.fr:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) from LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 LASER, Faculté d'Economie, Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 MONTPELLIER Cedex 2, France. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Christophe POUDOU ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-01-02
Handle: RePEc:mop:lasrwp:2005.17