Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?
FangFang Tan and
Erte Xiao ()
No 06-18, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics
We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisonerâ€™s dilemma game with third party punishment, we find groups punish more when the penalty embeds deterrence than when it can only be retributive. In contrast, individual third partiesâ€™ punishment decisions do not vary on whether the punishment has any deterrent effect. In general, third party groups are less likely to impose punishment than individuals even though the punishment is costless for third parties.
Keywords: Third-party punishment; group decision making; retribution; deterrence; social dilemmas; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence? (2018)
Working Paper: Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mos:moswps:2018-06
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