An endogenous-timing conflict game

Youngseok Park Youngseok, Jean Paul Rabanal (), Olga Rud () and Philip Grossman

No 13-20, Monash Economics Working Papers from Monash University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjo¨str¨om, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous- timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

Keywords: Conflict game; Endogenous timing; Gender; Laboratory experiment; Type uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: An endogenous-timing conflict game (2021)
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