An endogenous-timing conflict game

Youngseok Park, Jean Paul Rabanal (), Olga Rud () and Philip Grossman

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 186, issue C, 592-607

Abstract: We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjöström, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

Keywords: Conflict game; Endogenous timing; Gender; Laboratory experiment; Type uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268120304352
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: An endogenous-timing conflict game (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:186:y:2021:i:c:p:592-607

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.026

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().